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The Transitions to "Electoral"
and Democratic Politics
in Central America:
Assessing the Role of Political Parties
Morris }. Blackman and Kenneth E. Sharpe

As the 1990s opened, the only country in Central America that could
claim to hold periodic free and fair elections was Costa Rica. El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua all had held elections, but this
inchoate "electoral politics" still fell considerably short of democratic
politics. In general, there was little effective participation or broad-based
representation and little political accountability between the elected
officials and their supporters, and elected officials had limited power visA-vis a still-dominant military and, in some cases, a still-powerful
oligarchy.
After colonial times in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Honduras powerful, entrenched classes led by landed interests (but also
including commercial and financial elites) and powerful military
institutions opposed, often brutally, groups that sought to create
democratic political institutions. Following World War II, however, the
defense of the existing land tenure system, of related economic interests,
and of military power and privilege became more difficult, as important
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national and international changes created new social forces that
demanded reform and democracy. When change failed to occur, many
turned to revolution. As the structural conditions of the old system,
what some have called "reactionary despotism," broke down, the landed
and military elites reacted with a mixture of repression and largely
cosmetic reforms in an effort to restore order and maintain their power
and privilege.^ The "electoral politics" of the 1980s was part of this
response.^ Only in Costa Rica, where the post-World War 11 transfor
mations had an impact on political and class structure, was the pattern
different.
In Central America we find three categories of electoral politics;
pseudo, limited, and democratic. In pseudo electoral politics, there is a
pretense of electoral democracy. The casting of ballots is conducted in a
relatively free and fair manner, as is much of the counting of them. But
certain segments of the population—particularly those on the left—are
systematically excluded from participation (for example, in El Salvador
in 1982). The electoral process is truncated by limited and unequal access
to the media and the public. Those in power use intimidation and
coercion to maintain control. Outcomes are also closely monitored so
that ruling groups do not lose control over the political system or major
policy decisions. The leadership is not accountable to the citizenry at
large. To the extent accountability exists within the system, it does so
among factions of the ruling groups.
In limited electoral politics, most groups in the society are permitted
to participate. The casting and counting of ballots is conducted in a
relatively free and fair manner. Candidates and parties have considerably
greater access to the media and to the public. Intimidation and coercion
have significantly diminished, but this reduction resulted from a political
decision by the ruling groups; that decision, therefore, could be reversed
at any time. Outcomes are respected, but the power of those elected to
make significant changes in important policy areas is severely restricted.
Those who hold office may have little power, and fundamental control
of the system is not up for grabs (for example, in Honduras). Account
ability of leadership to the citizenry is weakly maintained. Principal
accountability is to the ruling groups.
Democratic electoral politics involves open participation in a free and
fair electoral process. Voting and tallying the ballots is fair and free.
Access to the media and to the public is not hampered by either overt
nor tacit political restriction, nor is it limited by intimidation or coercion.
Outcomes are respected, and control over the political system and its
agenda is up for grabs at election time. The leadership is accountable to
the electorate through the regularized periodic holding of elections.®
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The Pre-World War II Structure:
Reactionary Despotism
Baloyra uses the term reactionary despotism to describe the regimes of
Central America that were based on landed interest and opposed to
political and social modernization—that is, democracy and social reform.
At the heart of reactionary despotism was what Weeks describes as a
"system of land tenure and labor coercion that emerged during the
nineteenth century, itself predicated upon authoritarianism. "*
It was not the concentration of land that was critical to this system but
the coercive use of labor, which developed particularly in Guatemala, El
Salvador, and, to a lesser extent, in Nicaragua. The landed oligarchies
(concentrated particularly on large estates in Guatemala and El Salvador)
relied on the state to ensure the large labor supply they needed in two
ways. The state dispossessed peasants from the prime coffee lands, often
using liberal land reform laws, which turned inalienable communal lands
into private property. This not only provided the coffee growers with
prime land, but also with a large, underemployed labor force. Second,
the state created various coercive labor systems: debt peonage, labor
contracts, and, later, vagrancy laws, as well as the colono system, in
which landowners assigned plots to families in exchange for field labor
when required.®
Thus, coffee production for the world market expanded, yet the
commercialization of agriculture did not result in modern capitalist labor
relations. Instead it resulted in coercive, often feudal, methods of labor
control, and the landed interests depended heavily on a necessarily
antidemocratic state and military to maintain these systems.
If recalcitrance to reform and democracy among Central American
elites was shaped by the perceived need to maintain a coercive labor
system supported by state repression, it was also reinforced by two other
factors: the growth of a military with institutional interests of its own
and U.S. intervention in the area. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, the
military played a major role much earlier than in Guatemala or Hondu
ras. El Salvador's oligarchy ceded considerable power to the military for
decades following the 1932 massacre. In Guatemala and Honduras, the
militaries did not take on a life or interests independent of economic
elites until later. But officers in the high commands did assume economic
and political interests that were not those of the oligarchies. They
became involved in corruption and often practiced or condoned brutality.
As a result, many of them developed suspicion, distrust, even fear of
democratic reformers who might challenge their position or punish their
actions.
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The United States often mediated or intervened in intra-elite disputes.
Yet
because Washington demonstrated a willingness to use force to keep
certain groups in power (having put them there in the first place in some
cases), the ruling elites felt little pressure to accommodate the demands of
the middle and lower classes for reform or even nominal political participa
tion.*
Post-World War II;
Repression, Revolution, and "Electoral Politics"
Central America entered the post-World War II period with no
country experiencing regular, free, and fair elections, let alone democ
racy. With the exception of Costa Rica, the economic and military elites
had at best little interest in democratic reforms (Honduras) and at worst
were willing to use force and state repression against those who sought
political or social reform (El Salvador, Nicaragua). In addition, aside from
Costa Rica, the particular form of economic development they experi
enced had not created an independent small farmer class, an economi
cally strong or viable urban middle class, or an industrial/entrepreneurial
group that might have organized to demand a political voice and social
reform.
Yet important internal and world system changes beginning in the late
1940s and early 1950s created a new historical conjuncture. With it came
pressures for political and social change from new groups demanding
social reform and political democracy. The different reactions of the
nulitary and economic elites in each country generated patterns of
repression, reform, and insurrection out of which emerged the forms of
electoral politics present in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Four interrelated moments can be found in this conjuncture.
1. Transformation of the internal economic and class structure as a
response to a changed relationship with the world capitalist system. In
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s Central American military and economic
elites used state power to change important relations of production.
There was a diversification out of coffee and bananas into cotton, sugar,
and cattle. The commercialization of agriculture favored those with
access to capital or credit; thus, thousands of smallholders, squatters,
and tenant farmers were forced from their lands. Concentration of
landholding increased in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua as
commercial agriculture worsened the problem of land scarcity.^
The creation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the
early 1960s stimulated industrial growth without the major reforms
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necessary to redistribute income and create adequate markets in each
individual country. CACM helped spur industri^ization and growth,
and trade among the five sk)n-ocketed from $32 million in 1960 to $260
million in 1969.® Such efforts to stimulate growth were pushed along by
U.S. economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress. The structure
reforms urged by the Alliance, however, were largely ignored.
Light industrialization created jobs but not in sufficient number to
counteract rural dislocation and rapid population growth. Thus, years of
rapid GNP growth were also paradoxically years of increasing inequality
and joblessness.® These economic transformations put forward new
social forces. The ntuddle class expanded. The urban labor force grew.
Displaced peasants were forced to seek scarce work for low wages and
swelled the numbers of underemployed rural wage laborers. Others
moved to urban slums.
These new social forces were organized into new associations. Centrist
and leftist political parties organized and demanded reforms and civilian
government. Sometimes the military and the oligarchy responded with
reactionary counterorganizations as they sought to create official parties
or rule through existing parties. But in no country except Costa Rica did
the reformist parties have the organization and power to play a major
role in creating a transition to democratic electoral politics. In fact, it
often fell to nonparty associations to organize the new social forces: labor
unions, peasant organizations, and popular organizations, often building
on comunidades de base, Christian base communities.
2, Transformation of the Catholic church. These base communities
grew out of a revitalization of the church that began in the early 1960s
with Vatican II and was reinforced by the conference of Latin Ainerican
bishops at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. The bishops denounced
communism and capitalism as equal threats to human dignity and
located causes for the region's misery and hunger in a social and
economic structure dominated by the rich and powerful. Some factions
in the church began to weld the poor and dispossessed into a new social
force, organizing base communities, and called for a "preferential option
for the poor.
3. Short-term cyclical economic trends in the early 1980s. Beginning in
1979, economic decline engulfed the region. The causes were not limited
to the inequalities, joblessness, exhaustion of the import substitution
models, and uneven growth generated by the structural problems
discussed above. More immediate short-term factors also worsened
economic conditions and created severe internal pressures. One was the
effect of the civil wars that wreaked havoc in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua. A second was regional disintegration, much of it spurred
by the civil wars that undermined regional trade and the growth it had
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promoted. Finally there were a series of external shocks: "a sharp
deterioration in the terms of trade, declines in export volumes, and
suddeiUy rising interest rates on international debt."“
4. Changing U.S. geopolitical concerns. Although U.S. hegemony in
the international political and economic system has been declining, U.S.
policy is still guided by a hegemonic strategic vision. The United States
has been, at best, suspicious and, at worst, openly hostile to the popular
organizations and parties of the left, driving forces for reform and
change without which no large-scale democratic reform would have been
possible. As a consequence, the United States neither supports these
groups nor helps protect them from repression. At times, the United
States even encouraged the forces of repression on the grounds that
reformist groups and parties represented the opening wedge of
communism. These policies often served to strengthen the very nulitaries
whose opposition to reform blocked democracy in the first place. But
there was a contradictory effect as well: the price of getting U.S. military
and economic assistance was that the nulitary had to allow some politick
opening.
Reactionary Despotism to "Electoral Politics"
The impact of these structural conditions depended on the reaction of
landed and military elites in each country. There were two basic
patterns. In Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, Honduras the state was
less coercive and the economic and military elites less powerful, less
reactionary, and more open to elections, reform, and, especially in Costa
Rica, democratic electoral politics. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua powerful and recalcitrant economic elites, backed by increas
ingly strong militaries and coercive states, met efforts at reform with
brutal repression. The result was the outbreak of insurgencies and
revolutions. In El Salvador and Guatemala the transition to pseudo
electoral politics was part of the military's and the oligarchy's response
to the problems created by civil wars (armed insurrections). In Nicara
gua, the failure to respond with a transition to some form of electoral
politics fanned the flames of revolution.
Pseudo or Limited Electoral Politics
The transition to democratic electoral politics in Costa Rica came in the
late 1940s. It involved dismantling the military and establishing a broadly
representative and reformist democratic welfare state. But in the other
countries the potential transition, the opening for transition, appeared
to come only in the early 1980s and was restricted to pseudo or, at best,
limited electoral politics. This highly circumscribed transition resulted
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from internal pressure by parties and groups who sought full democracy
but lacked the power to force such change. It also resulted from extern^
pressures by the United States that shaped the "willingness" of the
military and authoritarian governments to allow the modest change.
In El Salvador the repression of reform efforts in 1979 and 1980 led to
full-scale revolution, which the military then had difficulty containing.
But the military's continuing desire for U.S. assistance led it to accept
limited political changes, pseudo electoral politics, to show enough
movement to overcome U.S. congressional reluctance to provide that
aid. The role of the United States in creating this alternative was much
more direct in El Salvador than in Guatemala.
In Guatemala the military was institutionalized, skilled, efficient, and
not personalistic like Somoza's National Guard. It relied on brutal
repression to destroy both reformers and mass organizations as well as
to bring insurgents under control in the countryside. When order was
restored and a military-authoritarian system institutionalized in the
countryside, the military was willing to move toward pseudo electoral
politics to resolve the severe economic difficulties created by its own
policies and worsened by international isolation. Military leaders
correctly thought that holding elections would overcome congressional
refusal to provide economic or military assistance and gain them a
certain legitimacy in Europe and Central America.
In Honduras the transition occurred without great organization or
pressure from mass organizations. Parties played a more important role,
but the military yielded primarily because of pressure from the Carter
administration. In Nicaragua, the Somoza regime refused to yield to
internal and external pressures for democratic reform. The consequence
was a broad-based revolution. The transition to electoral politics in
Nicaragua began in a postrevolutionary context.
With the exception of Costa Rica, one clear pattern emerged amid
these variations: the reluctance of the military to allow a transition except
as a way to get needed U.S. support, and then only under controlled
circumstances that assure its continued dominance. The military allows
the aperture because it is worried about its ability to handle increasing
pressure from below, from social movements. At the same time it seeks
to maintain an economic model that promises growth, legitimizes its
rule, and does not disturb its allies among the economic elites. This in
turn often demands external economic and military support. If the
military's lack of international legitimacy threatens its ability to sustain
its political and economic model or if its ability to control emerging social
movements seems to be weakening, then it is likely to turn toward some
form of electoral politics so as to avoid greater pressure, which might
threaten it as an institution.
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Once the military decides to allow an electoral process and civilian
government, it seeks to control and limit the transition process. The kind
of control it seeks and its ability to achieve that control vary depending
on the country's history, but we can make some broad generalizations
about its intentions.
•

•

•

The military will seek to exclude from the range of opposition
parties any organizations that seek broad or rapid socioeconomic
change or that are perceived as wanting to challenge the power
and prerogatives of the military. The military will seek to work
with those who seek legal-political changes, not structural ones.
It will favor partial, interim changes—elections for a constituent
assembly, elections for an interim president, and a vote on the
constitution—rather sweeping reforms that include the election of
a president or parliament.*^
It will seek to limit the control of elected civilian regimes over the
military, such as the power to punish military officers for past
human rights abuses, to tame corruption, to end military
sinecures, to control military budgets, or to determine military
policy. They may do this by making pacts or agreements with
those parties they will allow to take office.

In short, there is a pattern in the electoral strategies of the military.
The military will define as "democratic" and "legitimate" those parties
that do not threaten mass mobilization, demand structural transforma
tion, or challenge military prerogatives. This excludes parties that would
want to incorporate or organize the popular sectors and mass organiza
tions and may even exclude democratic socialists. The military may use
techniques to exclude these other groups such as refusal to grant them
protection, repression (death squads, arrests, harassment, intimidation,
disappearance, torture), and limited access to the media. The military
will try to control the electoral calendar and slow, delay, or reverse the
process if things seem to be getting out of control.*® The military might
also try to control the balloting.
This permits us to suggest two hypotheses concerning the role of
political parties in the transition process.
•

•

Parties do not play a major role in creating the conditions for an
electoral transition. But once the military and economic elites
decide to allow the transition to take place, certain parties,
especially moderate and centrist ones, can play an important role
in organizing the electoral process and the transition.
Because of the restrictions placed on the transition process by the
military and dominant groups, parties are severely limited in their
ability (1) to articulate a reform program that challenges the
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power of the military or threatens the basic socioeconomic
structure, and (2) to establish effective working alliances with
center-left or left parties or with mass organizations whose
support might later be necessary to bring about major structural
reforms. This puts the moderate parties in a vulnerable position
on taking office. The political compromises these centrist parties
must make to be able to participate in the process limits their
power and, perhaps, their will to undertake the major socioeco
nomic changes needed to move to democratic electoral politics.“
The Transition to Democratic Electoral Politics
In Costa Rica democratic electoral politics had already become firmly
rooted in the years following the 1948 Revolution, llie transition to
pseudo or limited electoral politics in the other four countries in the
1980s thrust reformist, modernizing political parties into new prominence
after decades of exclusion and, often, repression. But the transitions left
those electoral systems still far from democratic. Further, the parties in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras lacked the power and authority
to grapple with the dilemmas they confronted, and even the much more
powerful National Liberation Party in Costa Rica and the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua faced severe constraints.
The traditional yardstick for measuring progress toward democracy
emphasizes the processes and procedures of Western democra
cies—political parties, competitive elections, and a certain consensus
about the rules of the game. The absence of these criteria show the
serious defects in electoral politics in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. The problem has generally not been a lack of opposition
parties to compete in elections but a failure on their part to aggregate
emergent new interests. This leaves wide sectors among the peasantry,
the unemployed, urban workers, and slum dwellers under- or unrepre
sented.
One reason opposition parties have been unable to represent labor
unions, peasant organizations, or other popular organizations is that the
parties have been denied the opportunity to develop public support from
these groups. The parties have not had adequate access to the press, and
their members' ability to assemble, speak, and organize has too often
been threatened by unwarranted arrest, torture, assassination, and
disappearance.“
Worse, parties sometimes make pacts with those who have tradition
ally monopolized power—the military and economic elites—thereby
ensuring the continued exclusion of important sectors of the population.
These pacts, whether unwritten or written, decide the distribution of
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power—who gets what, when, and how. The pact between El Salvador's
Qiristian Democrats and the military immediately following Jos6
Napoledn Duarte's election as president is one such example.
Electoral politics is further weakened by the personalism and
factionalism so prevalent in many parties in the region. In the Central
American context, this "reinforces the tendency toward internal
competition and conflict resolution, rather than on purpose and problem
solving. In this context, payoffs (political favors, jobs, unequal access to
limited resources such as foreign exchange) are related back to groups
competing for power, not forward to their consequences to society."^*
Although the elections in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras did
lead the military to step down from governmental office, it continues to
rule behind the scenes in El Salvador and Guatemala and remains the
major force in Honduras.^’’
Thus, the elected officials in these three countries are to a great extent
figureheads; they are accountable to the military and, to some extent, the
oligarchies and economic elites but not to the citizenry at large. Elected
officials hold office but little power. They lack the power to carry out
land reform or to tax and are often limited in their power to protect the
basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press necessary for
democratic practices. They cannot punish officers who have been
involved in crimes; they cannot investigate and have difficulty stopping
disappearances, torture, and assassinations. They cannot end military
corruption or bring the military under civilian control. The exceptions are
Costa Rica, where there is no military, and Nicaragua, where the ruling
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) controlled the military before
the 1990 election.
A hidden dynamic, however, is built into the present situation. The
ability of the parties to sustain their status, let alone be the impetus for
a transition toward electoral democracy, is shaped by their capacity to
handle demands of their own supporters, who view the transition to
pseudo or limited electoral politics not simply as a good in and of itself
but as a mechanism for achieving reform. In each country there are
demands for land reform, labor reform, and economic recovery. In El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, there are demands to lift restric
tions on civil liberties, to end human rights violations, and to bring the
military under civilian control. In El Salvador and Guatemala there are
also calls to find negotiated solutions to the armed conflicts. In Nicara
gua conservatives have been demanding the military be freed from the
control of the FSLN.
But the parties all face serious internal constraints in dealing with
these often contradictory demands. At the same time the elections in
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have only given the parties
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office, not power, they have also created political openings that have
enabled popular associations to organize and put forward their demands
outside of narrow electoral channels. The parties are constrained in
meeting those demands not only by the continued power of the military,
but also by the limits the capitalist economy places on state action:
failure to ensure an appropriate investment climate will lead to disinvest
ment and economic deterioration.
In Nicaragua the constraints on the Sandinista government were
shaped by both the Contra War and the need to deliver on reforms.
Reforms were difficult to finance and were opposed by economically
powerful opposition groups. The Chamorro government, victor in the
1990 elections, is no longer constrained by the Contra War, but it is
severely limited by economic devastation, created in large measure by
that war and by the powerful demands for economic relief by the FSLN
and popular organizations.
In addition, there are serious external constraints. Service payments
on foreign debt drain much-needed foreign exchange. Restrictions on
economic policy placed by the international banks, the IMF, or the U.S.
embassy as the condition for more loans force austerity and devalua
tions, which makes needed reform and growth difficult. The geopolitical
strategies of the United States have also imposed serious external
constraints on the region. In El Salvador, the U.S. embassy for years
vetoed a negotiated solution to the war in favor of continuing the
counterinsurgency program. The United States also opposed any
significant opening of political space for many popular organizations and
the left. In Honduras, U.S. policy was designed to make Honduras a
forward base for U.S. strategy against Nicaragua.
Managing demands for reform in the face of such internal and
external constraints would be a severe test even for strong, stable
Western democracies. The "elected" governments in Central America do
not have the remotest ability to handle such difficulties unless they
generate the power and authority that only a transition toward greater
democracy and more popular support could give them. What then are
the prospects for such a transition, and what role might parties play in
it?
If we judge electoral politics in Central America using formal
procedural criteria drawn from Western European and North American
electoral and party systems, we conclude that all countries except Costa
Rica and to some extent Nicaragua are far from democratic. Further, the
prospects for democracy are not good. Some critics are harsher. They
brand elections like those in El Salvador as merely "demonstration
elections"^ and describe Central America as a region of "facade
democracies" (democradas de fachada)?'^
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Without question Central American social reality constitutes a harsh
environment for the development of democracy. But if our criteria are
based on a less formal, less Western European model, the prospects for
democracy, while still difficult, appear more promising. We can define
democracy in terms of the relationship between citizens and their leaders
without specifying a goal or purpose. It is a system in which informed
citizens can participate actively and effectively in making decisions that
shape their lives and in which they can hold their leaders politically
accountable to themselves and to laws made with the effective participa
tion of the citizeiuy.* Further, it is a system in which there is an
underlying consensus about who is a citizen and who can participate in
politics, about the rules of the game for participation and accountability,
and some rough consensus on which areas of life can be legislated and
which are beyond the authority of the state.^ Approaching democracy
this way incorporates the concern of the two other major approaches
toward democracy: the formal approach, which focuses on having
adequate procedures for setting the rules of the game for democracy,
and the substantive approach, which recognizes the necessity for citizens
to have the capacity to enter and play the game using the same set of
rules.
Within our approach, we focus on three key criteria to assess the role
of political parties in the transition to electoral democracy: effective
participation, civic virtue, and accountability.^ Competitive elections are,
therefore, not synonymous with democratic politics. Rather, a country
is more democratic the more it allows and encourages such participation,
the more widespread the underlying consensus on rules of the game and
linuts of authority, and the more it fosters accountability. Judged by
these criteria, the countries of Central America look varied, from
democratic in Costa Rica to much less so in El Salvador or Guatemala.
In this transition to electoral politics, political parties could play a far
more significant role than mere participation in competitive elections. To
assess their prospects in a transition process to electoral democracy, the
student of parties should address the following key questions.
I. How Can Parties Help Create Conditions
That Might Enhance Effective Participation?
Effective political participation requires that people be allowed the
freedom to assemble and speak, to organize associations, to formulate
and press their demands, and to have the freedom of the press
necessary to gain and disseminate information. It also requires institu
tions through which these demands can be heard and considered.
Necessary as well is a minimal level of economic resources—money and
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time—to allow the parties to make use of the freedom to organize and to
utilize effectively the institutional channels for articulating their
demands.
Elections are only one such institution, and parties only one kind of
organization for effective political participation. Other associations
include labor unions, peasant organizations, cooperatives, Christian base
community groups, neighborhood groups, women's, students', and
teacher and professional organizations—what are often called "popular"
organizations in the Central American context. Nonelectoral institutions
for effective participation may include legally sanctioned collective
bargaining, local development projects directed by local organizations,
and self-government of universities.
Honduras and especially Costa Rica have been relatively open to such
nonparty modes of participation and have allowed freedom of assembly,
speech, the press, and association without much fear of repression. But
the social and economic resources to facilitate such participation are often
not available to a large majority of the population.
In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Somoza's Nicaragua such popular
organizations did, at times, form, but in each case, by the late 1970s,
they had been severely repressed and there was little effective political
participation. One consequence of the transition to electoral politics in
El Salvador and Guatemala and of the revolution in Nicaragua, has been
the creation of improved conditions—however limited—for such political
participation. In El Salvador and Guatemala the military's willingness to
allow a transition to pseudo electoral politics was in large part the result
of a broader effort to gain international legitimacy, particularly within the
U.S. Congress. This required a reduction in some of the most brutal
forms of repression—death squad killings, assassinations, disappear
ances—and the lifting of certain restrictions on the press, on the freedom
to demonstrate, and on the right to strike. This created a political
opening that not only allowed party activity but also the reemergence of
participation by popular organizations. This participation is still limited
and could be closed down again. Nevertheless the growing effectiveness
of participation is evident in cooperatives, slum communities, refugee
camps, and even prisons.
In Nicaragua, the revolution increased the ability of some popular
organizations to participate and limited the effectiveness for others.
Many of these were organized before the Sandinista party came to power
and thus maintained an independence of the party organization; new
ones were formed subsequent to the revolution. Still others, mostly on
the right, ceased to exist. Organizations of small peasants and producers
(UNAG), of growers (like the rice growers association), and of women
(like ANMALAE), originally closely directed by the FSLN, grew
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increasingly independent and often participated effectively in decisions
that affected the lives of their members. Other groups (both the
communist and noncommunist opposition unions) were allowed to
organize, but until the 1990 election their participation was limited by
such actions as government efforts to prevent strikes and the state of
emergency imposed during the Contra War.
Given the importance of such nonparty participation in democratic
politics, it is important to ask how parties have helped expand condi
tions for effective participation? Parties face two different tasks in this
respect: first, incorporating new groupings into the political system and,
second, expanding the political space for themselves and others to create
a well-functioning system. It is important to examine the role parties
play in bringing popular organizations and mass movements. Do these
relationships provide for representation of the interests of these groups,
or are they cooptive and controlling like Mexico's ruling Revolutionary
Institutional Party (PRI) or Argentina under Per6n?
Trying to incorporate emerging sectors into the ongoing political fabric
is difficult. With the exception of the Sandinistas, few parties have had
the skill or the wherewithal to mobilize large groups of people.^ As we
pointed out earlier, some of the parties, including "modernizing" ones
like the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in El Salvador, have been
willing to accommodate other dominant power groups at the cost of
excluding these newly emerging sectors.
Moreover, some members of society are significantly restrained from
effective participation as a result of the structures, values, and behavior
prevalent in other societal institutions—family, religion, and so on—that
carry over into the political system. Class analysis will address some
aspects of this problem, but attention should also be paid to the ways
the society incapacitates social groupings such as women in their ability
to participate, to overcome the institutionalized biases that may inhibit
or prevent these social groupings from participating effectively.^^ Are
the parties even exploring these issues? Do they have programs to
address them?
What role do the parties play in helping expand the necessary
conditions of effective participation—ensuring freedom of assembly,
organization, and the press; taming the military and death squad abuses
of human rights; ensuring access to the media and the safety of persons
who want to organize; overcoming institutionalization biases? Although
it is important to examine how parties seek to make it possible to
establish broad center-left coalitions that could bring excluded leftist
parties into the political system, it is also important to note their
contribution to the establishment of a system in which opposition and
dissenting parties and coalitions are, at minimum, permitted.
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In El Salvador in late 1980 attempts were made to broker an agree
ment between the Frente Democr&tica Revolucionario (FDR) and PDC, but
these collapsed when the military assassinated the FDR leaders in
November of that year. In 1981, Washington sought to promote a PDCARENA (AlianzaRepublicanaNadonalista.) coalition to modernize the right
wing/death squad oligarchy and ally its party with the Christian
Democrats. More recently, the Convergencia Democr&tica has tried to bring
together center-left parties and popular organizations in a united front
to push for reforms and a negotiated solution to the war. In Nicaragua,
the FSLN helped mobilize the involvement of formally excluded groups
in politics. It will be interesting to see how the Unidn Nacional Oposicidn
and its constituent parties will function under current conditions.
Finally, the parties must work to expand the base of empowered
participants. This requires releasing the tight grip on leadership positions
and changing the old, ineffective rules of the game. Parties must develop
mechanisms for recruiting and training followers and leaders.
II. How Effectively Do Parties Foster Values and
Attitudes Supportive of Democratic Civic Virtues?
A key facet of the transition to electoral democracy is the promotion
of values and attitudes that sustain and expand democratic institutions
and practices. Among them are the creation of a climate of trust and
honesty, respect for the rule of law, tolerance of opposing views, and
reliance on peaceful means for resolving political conflict, especially the
use of negotiation and compromise.“ A student of political parties must
explore the contribution parties might make to fostering such democratic
civic virtue.
Honesty is essential to promoting effective participation and account
ability. As Kalman Silvert wrote.
Lying is the most nefarious political offense....Untruths....destroy the
possibility of creating common perceptions of political events, and therefore
can fracture a political community at all levels of participation....Political
falsehoods create many social events out of one empirical occurrence,
threaten community cohesion by opening up the possibility of value
conflicts...tend to produce erratic politics, and this...impoverishes
individuals and societies.“

To what degree do political parties promote honesty in both their own
behavior and in that of other politically relevant actors? In a situation
where the government or ruling class elite lies to the citizenry, political
parties can provide a reliable alternative source of information, giving the
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public a way to judge the validity of what they are told. Further, by
encouraging honesty and integrity in the system and among their own
members, they can help pass these values on to party members and to
the rest of the society.
The events of the past two decades in Latin America have led to a
renewed commitment to the rule of law by those who seek to move
away from authoritarianism toward a democratic order. Arbitrariness and
inequity in the application of power and the great difficulty of stopping
military and vigilante forces from regularly taking the law into their own
hands underline the importance of an effective legal system for electoral
democracy.^
The law sets the rules defining the nature of legitimate participation
and the mechanisms through which leadership can be held accountable.
To what degree do the political parties actively support the rule of law,
even in the face of strong opposition or a losing decision? To what
degree do they demonstrate their commitment and support for the rule
of law by their behavior within the party itself? How do the parties seek
to transmit this value to their own adherents as well as to other
members of the nation?
In democratic electoral politics diversity and dissent are to be
celebrated, not suppressed. As Kalman Silvert argues, democratic politics
"should be seen not as the art of guiding the use of legitimized force, but
as the art of promoting and synthesizing difference.
Dissent not only
permits the consideration of alternative policy options, it can also
provide correction in the system for inaccurate or misleading informa
tion—whether the inaccuracies or misinformation were purposeful or not.
In this latter sense, dissent is important to accountability. In the former
sense it is a key to effective participation. In both cases, the valuing of
dissent is a critical civic virtue.
To what degree then are parties supporting the presentation of
dissenting views? To what degree do they encourage this within the
deliberations of the party itself? How, if at all, are they attempting to
pass on the importance of tolerating, if not encouraging, dissent?
Conflict among differing ideas is essential to accountability. Indeed,
conflict is a normal part of democratic processes. What is important
about conflict is not that it occurs, but that it is bounded by an accep
tance of the rules of the game, which require settling disputes peace
fully, through the political process. Many Chileans learned this lesson
during the Pinochet years. Members of parties that had engaged in
conflict with other parties to the point of political homicide began to
realize that although the struggle was important, having an arena in
which such conflicts could take place was even more important than the
outcome of a particular fight. ^
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Respect for the rights of others to hold different views and to seek
different policies means accepting victory without trying to destroy the
opposition and accepting defeat knowing that other opportunities to
compete will not be denied. The presence of an arena for the resolution
of political conflict through negotiation and compromise must be more
highly valued than victory on any specific issue.* Students of parties
need to examine the efforts parties make to stimulate the peaceful
resolution of conflicts; to support a process of negotiation and compro
mise as opposed to arbitrary rule, the use of force, or the political
extinction of opposition; and to promote the use of an open political
process to resolve disputes within the party.
HI. How Can Parties Help Create Conditions
That Enhance Political Accountability?
Accountability is more difficult for political parties to effect than is
participation or the promotion of civic virtue. Nonetheless, political
parties are central actors in political life and their role is a crucial one.
Throughout much of Central America's history, governments have either
been the province of the relatively few privileged members of society or
caretakers accountable "to either the military, the oligarchy, the private
external financial interests with investments in the country, or some
combination of these groups.
Attempting to hold regimes accountable in the Central American
context may be not only dangerous, but in some cases may also be futile.
The "lack of internal structures for promoting and fostering open
discussions about political issues" has been a persistent problem. "Few
of the region's countries have allowed for ongoing debate and discussion
among moderates and the non-revolutionary left."®^ In some cases
political actors have turned to the international arena to bolster their
efforts to hold regimes accountable.*
Finally, the issue of accountability cannot be resolved without
considering the role of the United States. As the preeminent, most
powerful external actor in the region, the United States has had a
profound impact in each of the Central American nations.* Traditional
ly the U.S. embassy has been such a major player that it has, all too
often, inhibited the development of internal political accountability of the
government to the local citizenry and nation. As Rosenberg observes.
In Central America, the United States has unrivaled political power and
resources and represents one of the largest economic enterprises in each
country....The U.S. ambassador is one of the most studied figures in each
country. The embassy itself, its staff, programs, and aid activities, are
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analyzed, scrutinized, and then hustled by locals who specialize in
"working" the U.S. institution....National politicians and military officials
inevitably spend as much time cultivating U.S. embassy clientele and
visiting dignitaries as they do with their own nationals. ®

To maintain the integrity of a nation's electoral democracy, accountability
to the United States must be substantially subordinated to accountability
to the citizens of the country.

Conclusion
We have endeavored to accomplish two tasks in this chapter; first, to
show the significant changes that have taken place in the context in
which political parties operate in Central America in the past several
decades and, second, to provide a framework and series of questions by
which one can assess the role parties can play in a transition from
pseudo or limited electoral politics to more fully democratic politics.
Answers to the three overarching questions—concerning effective
participation, civic virtue, and accountability—will help us understand
that phenomenon.
As the transition from pseudo to linuted to democratic politics occurs,
greater numbers of individuals and groups participate and accountability
grows. Therefore, the closer one comes to democratic electoral politics,
the more social forces there are with which to compete, and all political
participants, including political parties, become more empowered.
Any reasonable assessment of the role of political parties in promoting
a transition to democracy must recognize the limited impact they can
have. Parties are only one of many actors, and they are not autonomous
and are composed of a relatively small number of adherents. Finally,
their power to act in the system is also circumscribed by the broader,
external socioeconomic and political context, which includes actors such
as the United States.
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